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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
K E N N E T H W. GIBB, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
E A R L N. D O R I U S , Director, Driver 
License Division, State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF THE PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The appellant requests the Court's rehearing of 
the following materials as set forth under the headings 
in support of the allegations of the appellant. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON R E H E A R I N G 
The appellant respectfully requests the Court to 
review the attached brief in support of the petition for 
Case No. 
13626 
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rehearing and based thereon grant an opportunity for 
appellant and respondent to reargue the matter and/or 
reverse the Court's finding or remand the case back to 
the trial court for the ascertaining of additional facts 
in order to render a more complete opinion, to give 
greater clarification and amplification to the decision 
previously rendered, for the following reasons: 
1. To afford an opportunity for counsel for ap-
pellant and respondent to further argue the issue as to 
what if any credence the court must grant to Chapter 
53, Laws of Utah 1967, the Federal Highway Safety 
Act of 1966, and any amendments thereto, including 
but not limited to the Highway Safety Program Man-
ual, Volume 8, transmittal 9, dated January 17, 1969, 
a portion of the same abstracted and included in the 
appendix attached to this brief; further, Sections 26-
15-4(1), (3), (10), (11), (12), and (20) granting 
certain rights and responsibilities to the State Depart-
ment of Health; and further to the Rules and Regula-
tions as promulgated by the State of Utah, Depart-
ment of Social Services, State Division of Health, dated 
December 30, 1969, relating to the rules and regulations 
for approval to perform blood alcohol examinations. 
2. To afford an opportunity, if so ordered by the 
court to remand the matter back to the trial level, to 
ascertain additional facts if deemed necessary by the 
court, relative to whether or not Mr. Davis at the time 
and place in question was acting in the scope of his em-
ployment as a technician for the Salt Lake City-Coun-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ty Health Department, and whether said laboratory in 
the Salt Lake City-County Health Department, was 
within the purview of the regulations of December 30, 
1969, promulgated by the Utah State Board of Health, 
a "qualified" or "certified" laboratory to participate in 
the performance of blood alcohol examinations. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
T H E COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO SET FORTH IN T H E OPINION 
WHAT RECOGNITION SHOULD BE 
GIVEN TO T H E STATUS OF T H E 
SALT LAKE CITY-SALT L A K E 
COUNTY H E A L T H DEPARTMENT, 
A N D ITS PHYSICIAN-DIRECTOR 
(DR. HARRY GIBBONS), OR TO 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF HEALTH, 
AND ITS DIRECTOR, (DR. LYMAN 
OLSON), OR TO T H E RULES AND 
REGULATIONS OF T H E DEPART-
MENT OF SOCIAL S E R V I C E S , 
STATE DIVISION OF HEALTH, IN 
AND FOR T H E STATE OF UTAH, 
AS PROMULGATED DECEMBER 30, 
1969, W H I C H ARE PUBLISHED AND 
A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD 
AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN 
INTO ACCOUNT BY T H E COURT IN 
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A D D I T I O N TO A N D I N CONNEC-
TION W I T H T H E M E D I C A L PRAC-
T I C E S ACT, I F SAID ACT I S CON-
T R O L L I N G . 
The Utah Code provision, Section 41-6-44.10(f), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, the last 
sentence thereof, which is the grant of immunity, is con-
ditioned upon the test being administered according to 
standard medical practice. The full import of that lan-
guage is that if the blood test as taken (emphasis ours) 
is contested, and if in fact it was not administered ac-
cording to standard medical practice, either the person 
performing or administering the test, or that facility 
at which it was done, could not avoid immunity if they 
failed to follow standard medical practice. In this case, 
no test was taken; no improper procedure is claimed. 
For the court to infer as broadly as it has that the 
drawing of any blood or administering of any medica-
tion that requires the puncturing of the skin of a human 
being can only be done under the "direct supervision of 
a physician" leaves a question as to the practice within 
this jurisdiction, in nursing homes, hospitals, labora-
tories, by the paramedics, or anyone acting within the 
scope of their authority. 
Does the majority opinion mean "within the pres-
ence of a physician," or something he later approves, or 
in accordance with his direction but not in time or prox-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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imately, within his presence? None of these questions are 
clarified. 
The question appears to be whether their authority 
is a direct line to a physician. For the court to say that 
such is the case for any registered nurse, or any prac-
tical nurse, but not for a laboratory technician who may 
be acting directly under the supervision of a physician, 
strains the interpretation of the statute. The question is 
not answered properly by the majority opinion as to 
whether or not a person is by education and experience 
and qualification able to perform the act of administer-
ing the test. The court suggests it is merely a question 
of authority. Since the criteria within the statute was 
set up for physician, registered nurse, or practical nurse, 
that authority was assumed by the statute to be implicit 
within the requirements and regulation and rules of 
practice laid down by the qualifications requisite to ob-
taining licensing for those three categories. To give full 
and fair meaning to the term "duly authorized labora-
tory technician" such a laboratory technician could only 
be either directly authorized by a physician or one 
authorized by the State of Utah to so act pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-15-4(10) or 26-15-4(20) (1953, 
as amended. The court and the public at large are on 
notice by way of public records that there is a differenti-
ation, and there was at the time of the passing of the leg-
islation, a differentiation between authorized laboratory 
technicians and unauthorized laboratory technicians in 
the view of the State Division of Health, whose respon-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sibility it is to see to the public good and welfare and the 
health of the populous at large. (Emphasis ours.) 
The legislature has clearly spoken that each of the 
four categories were able and capable and subject to 
direction by a peace officer to comply with the statute 
in the taking of a blood sample for analysis and com-
municating said results to the law enforcement agency 
involved. 
A duly authorized laboratory technician could be 
one acting, as the majority opinion suggests, directly 
under the supervision of a properly licensed.physician 
within the State of Utah. However, a "duly authorized 
laboratory technician" in appellant's view, could equal-
ly as well be a properly certified, educationally quali-
fied, technician acting within the scope of his authority 
and employment in a properly qualified laboratory as 
certified to by the State Division of Public Health, who 
could and should, in the language of the federal Act 
and its regulations /'collect, identify, preserve, store, 
and hold in custody, blood, breath or other body mate-
rials for analysis for alcoholic content." 
Pursuant to those guidelines, the statutes set forth, 
and the regulations further promulgated by the State 
Division of Public Health meet the qualifications and 
said Division is as set forth therein, regularly certifying, 
re-evaluating, recertifying and communicating to law 
enforcement agencies and other required bodies the in-
formation relative to the laboratories which meet their 
requirements and regulations in addition to the technok 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ogists and the type of alcohol examination which may be 
administered at the particular institution specified. (At-
tachment A, I I , pg. 2.) 
To hold otherwise, than as suggested by the appel-
lant herein, giving some credence to the Division of 
Health and the regulations and statutes thereunder and 
to their compliance with the Federal Highway Safety 
Act Regulations and Rules as amended 1966, would be 
equally as much in error on the part of the court as for 
the court to, in its own view, in the majority opinion, 
fail to take into consideration the Utah Medical Prac-
tices Act. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E COURT E R R E D I N F A I L I N G 
TO T A K E I N T O C O N S I D E R A T I O N 
SECTION 26-15-4 (10) A N D (20), I N 
A D D I T I O N TO T H E M E D I C A L 
P R A C T I C E S ACT A N D F U R T H E R 
T H E F E D E R A L S A F E T Y ACT O F 
1966 A N D T H E L E G I S L A T I V E E N -
A C T M E N T S OF T H E L E G I S L A -
T U R E S OF 1967 A N D 1969, TO COM-
P L Y W I T H T H E ABOVE F E D E R A L 
ACT; A N D T H E S T A T U T E S OF T H E 
S T A T E SO E N A C E D A N D A N Y 
R U L E S A N D R E G U L A I O N S PROM-
U L G A T E D T H E R E U N D E R , SET-
T I N G F O R T H T H E C R I T E R I A F O R 
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I N D I V I D U A L S A N D P H Y S I C A L 
F A C I L I T I E S F O R T E S T S A N D T E S T -
I N G O F BLOOD S A M P L E S I N A N D 
F O R T H E S T A T E OF U T A H , A N D 
F O R A N Y P O L I T I C A L SUBDIVI-
SIONS T H E R E O F . 
The Federal Highway Safety Act of 1966 and 
amendments thereto require the State to comply with 
federal standards in order to participate in the High-
way Safety Program. In compliance therewith, Chap-
ter 53, Laws of Utah 1967, passed February 17, 1967 
which became effective on May 9, 1767, was passed 
enabling and empowering the Governor of the State 
to coordinate, to contract and to do all other necessary 
things in behalf of the State to secure the full benefits 
of the Highway Federal Safety Act of 1966 and any 
amendments thereto. In compliance with the Chapter 
53, the legislature and the Governor by legislation and 
by regulations of the executive branch so acted. As 
part of that, the 1967 legislature added subsection (22) 
to 26-15-4, which sets forth the responsibility and obli-
gation as follows: 
"26-15-4. State department of health— 
Powers and duties—The state department of 
health shall have and exercise the following 
powers and duties in addition to all other 
powers and duties imposed on it by law: 
(1) To exercise all the administrative 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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authority heretofore vested in the state board 
of health. 
(2) To protect and promote physical 
and mental health of the people. 
(3) To administer and enforce state 
health laws, regulations and standards. 
(10) Establish, maintain laboratories 
and make available laboratory services through 
purchase of such services from other approved 
laboratories and conduct research and such 
other laboratory investigations and examina-
tions as it may deem necessary or proper for 
the protection of the public health. 
(11) Make, approve and establish stand-
ards for diagnostic tests for communicable 
and infectious diseases by any laboratories 
operated or maintained by any county, city, 
institution, person, firm or corporation, and 
require such laboratories to conform thereto. 
(12) To establish and maintain chemical 
laboratory and engineering facilities to meet 
the needs for conducting field investigations 
and laboratory analysis in the study of occupa-
tional health hazards and air pollution. 
* * * 
(22) To establish, maintain and enforce 
a procedure requiring that the bodies of adult 
pedestrains and all drivers of motor vehicles 
killed in highway accidents be examined for 
the presence and concentration of alcohol; to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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provide the commissioner of public safety with 
statistics reflecting the results of the examina-
tions on a monthly basis; to provide adequate 
safeguards so that information derived from 
the examinations is used for no other purpose 
than compilation of statistics authorized here-
in. 
Subsection (22) of 26-15-4 was subsequently in 
1969 amended to replace the second word on the second 
line "bodies" to "blood" and as such has remained in 
tact. 
Subsection (10) of 26-15-4 specifically provided 
that the powers and duties of the Department of Health 
included as follows: 
"(10) Establish, maintain laboratories 
and make available laboratory services through 
purchase of such services from other approved 
laboratories and conduct research and such 
other laboratory investigations and examina-
tions as it may deem necessary or proper for 
the protection of the public health." 
This was a direct result of legislation as follows: 
C H A P T E R 53 
S. B. No. 24 (Passed February 17, 1967. 
In effect May 9, 1967; 
FEDERAL SAFETY ACT-
COMPLIANCE WITH 
An Act Providing for Compliance by the State 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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11 
with Requirements of the Federal Highway-
Safety Act of 1966. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State 
of Utahs 
Section 1. Governor Empowered to Coordinate 
Act. 
The governor, in addition to other duties 
and responsibilities conferred upon him by the 
constitution and laws of the state of Utah is 
hereby empowered to contract and to do all 
other things necessary in behalf of the state to 
secure the full benefits available to this state 
under the Federal Highway Safety Act of 
1966, and any amendments thereto, and in so 
doing, to cooperate with the federal and state 
agencies, agencies private and public, interest-
ed organizations, and with individuals, to ef-
fectuate the purposes of that enactment, and 
any and all subsequent amendments thereto. 
The governor shall be the official having the 
ultimate responsibility for dealing with the 
United States government with respect to pro-
grams and activities pursuant to the Federal 
Highway Safety Act of 1966, and any amend-
ments thereto. To that end he shall be respons-
ible for activities of any and all departments 
and agencies of this state and its subdivisions, 
relating thereo. He may designate an appro-
priate person, commission or board to assist 
him in coordinating the activities and programs 
contemplated under this subsection. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Section 2. Legislature Authorizes Political 
Subdivisions. 
The legislature of the state of Utah 
hereby authorizes the political subdivisions of 
this state to participate in the state highway 
safety program as contemplated by the Federal 
Highway Safety Act of 1966, and any amend-
ments thereto, and to do all things necessary 
to secure benefits available under that act. 
Approved February 27, 1967. 
In addition, the Highway Safety Program Manual 
promulgated Volume 8 "Alcohol in Relation to High-
way Safety" Transmittal No. 9, headed "Program De-
velopment and Operations" dated January 17, 1969. 
As part of this Manual of Instructions the Federal 
Highway Safety Program Manual sets forth in Chap-
ter 4 of Volume 8, the major elements that should con-
stitute a statewide program of alcohol in relation to 
highway safety. In paragraph 3 thereof, under chemical 
tests, it states as follows: 
"3A (1). Promulgate regulations con-
cerning the collection, identification, custody, 
preservation and storage of blood, breath, or 
other body materials obtained for analysis for 
alcohol content." (Emphasis ours.) 
All of chapter 4 is attached by way of attachment 
B to this brief. 
Under subparagraph 3, chemical tests, subpara-
graph A2, the regulation further suggests that the state 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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implement a suitable program for the evaluation of 
laboratories, agencies and individuals performing chemi-
cal tests for alcohol and that the performance reports 
should be maintained and prepared as public records. 
In the spirit of compliance, the 1967 legislature 
further amended Section 41-6-44, U.C.A. (1953, as 
amended), to provide for the .08 level in lieu of 0.15 
percent in subsection C. In the same legislative session 
through House Bill 217 the legislature amended Section 
41-6-44.10(a) U.C.A. (1953, as amended), to include 
the second sentence thereof designating that the arrest-
ing officer shall determine within reason which of the 
aforesaid tests shall be administered. At the same time 
the legislature inserted "registered nurse, practical 
nurse" in the first sentence in the former subsection C 
(present F ) and added the third sentence relative to 
immunity in said sentence. 
POINT I I I 
THE COURT ERRED IN THAT 
THE OPINION I NCHIEF FAILS TO 
CLARIFY T H E DISPUTED QUES-
TION ARGUE DAT T H E TRIAL 
LEVEL AS TO THE AUTHORITY OF 
T H E PERSON TO TAKE THE BLOOD 
S A M P L E , AND THEREBY CON-
FUSED THE ISSUE AS TO WHO A 
"DULY AUTHORIZED L A B O R A -
TORY T E C H N I C I A N " I S , O R 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
S H O U L D BE, OR W H E N , BY W H O M , 
OR W H E R E , SAID BLOOD S A M P L E S 
MAY B E D R A W N P U R S U A N T TO 
SECTION 41-6-44.10, U T A H CODE AN-
N O T A T E D 1953, AS A M E N D E D ; A N D 
T H E COURT F U R T H E R F A I L E D TO 
D I S T I N G U I S H T H E " D U L Y AU-
T H O R I Z E D L A B O R A T O R Y T E C H I N -
C I A N " FROM T H E U N A U T H O R I Z E D 
L A B O R A T O R Y T E C H N I C I A N , 
W H O M E V E R OR W H E R E V E R H E 
M A Y B E . 
I t does not logically follow from the majority opin-
ion that pursuant to Section 58-12-38 or Section 58-12-
40 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), 
that "medical assistant" as a category, would exclude 
properly authorized laboratories or any duly qualified 
laboratory technician within such laboratory acting with-
in the scope of his employment and therefore meet the 
criteria of the statute cited and interpreted by Justice 
Maughan. 
Such an individual within one of the qualified 
laboratories certified by the Utah State Department 
of Health would meet the criteria set forth by Justice 
Maughan as an "individual acting under the direction 
and supervision of a licensed physician." Such a tech-
nician, a c t i n g in the Salt Lake City-County 
Health Department Laboratory, or the L D S Hospital, 
the Bureau of Laboratories, Utah State Division of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Health, the Logan L D S Hospital, the Valley View 
Medical Center Laboratory, or ony other lab that had 
at the time in question been certified as approved by 
the Division of Helth as such a place, would be a "duly 
authorized laboratory technician." 
A duly authorized laboratory technician is one who 
meets the minimum standards set forth in the rules and 
regulations for approval to perform blood alcohol ex-
aminations adopted by the Utah State Board of Health 
on December 30, 1969, in accordance with its authority 
under Section 26-15-5(1) and Section 26-20-12 of the 
Utah Code. Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations sets 
forth specific personnel qualifications of a duly author-
ized technician. These personnel qualifications state as 
follows: 
Minimum educational requirements for a 
person or persons performing chemical exami-
nations for the determination of blood alcohol 
levels shall be a recognized Bachelor of Arts 
of Bachelor of Science degree or equivalent 
degree issued after a full course of resident 
instruction in one or more established and 
accredited institutions of higher education, with 
major work for such a degree in one or more 
fields of chemistry, as shown by a transcript 
of credits. Major work in the biological sciences 
may be accepted where related work experi-
ence has been acquired and providing that the 
earned degree includes a minimum of twenty-
five (25) quarter hours of courses in chemis-
try. In addition to the baccalaureate degree or 
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equivalent, the supervising chemist shall have 
demonstrated proficiency in blood alcohol de-
terminations as gained by attendance at perti-
nent courses or the equivalent in practical 
clinical chemical laboratory training and ex-
perience. 
Persons who have successfully completed 
a regular four years course in an established 
and accredited college or university, with major 
work leading to a degree in medical tech-
nology, providing such a course shall have in-
cluded not less than twenty-five (25) quarter 
hours of chemistry, may also meet the minimum 
personnel requirements, providing subsequent 
training has been acquired in the field of clini-
cal chemistry. 
A person who is and who has been per-
forming blood alcohol determinations for not 
less than two years at the time of the adoption 
of these standards, but who does not meet the 
above requirements, may also be qualified pro-
viding that, as determined by the Advisory 
Committee for Laboratory Standards, such 
person has completed not less than one year of 
pertinent education beyond the high school 
level, or has received training through an ac-
ceptable training program, providing such a 
person is shown to be competent to perform 
these examinations as demonstrated by an ex-
amination and satisfactory participation in a 
proficiency testing program offered or author-
ized by the Division of Health, and providing 
that such a person is employed under the full-
time supervision of a person meeting the quali-
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fications presented in the preceding para-
graphs. 
Registration by nationally recognized certi-
fying boards may be accepted by the director, 
on recommendation of the Advisory Commit-
tee for Laboratory Standards, in lieu of the 
baccalaureate degree. 
Technical personnel unable to meet these 
requirements may assist in the preparation and 
processing of specimens but may not be re-
sponsible for any of the definitive analysis. 
A properly approved laboratory is one which meets 
the criteria of the State pursuant to their rules and 
regulations promulgated December 30, 1969 (Attach-
ment A attached hereto) and qualifies as such a facility 
with approval of the State Division of Health. Any 
personnel properly certified by the lab, which laboratory 
had been approved by the state, acting within the scope 
of their employment, would meet the criteria of "duly 
authorized laboratory technician." 
There are laboratories within the State and facili-
ties not approved by the State Division of Health for 
the taking and testing of blood pursuant to Sections 
26-15-4(10), 26-15-5(1), 26-20-12, Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953), as amended. These do not comply with 
the regulations and criteria of the Utah State Division 
of Health promulgated December 30, 1969. 
However, in each of the above cases noted, said 
certified laboratory and their personnel acting within 
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the scope of their employment would be acting under 
the direction of a licensed physician. That would be Dr. 
Olson, head of the Utah State Division of Health. In 
the case o f the county laboratory as in Salt Lake County, 
such a technician would be, in addition, acting under the 
direction of Dr. Harry Gibbons, director of that com-
bined facility. Both men are licensed physicians. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the Court 
further failed, in its majority opinion, to take 
into account the fact that in the fourth category, the 
laboratory technician may not only administer the test 
by way of drawing the blood but if duly authorized may 
likewise run the analysis thereon. This dual role on the 
part of the laboratory technician who is a duly author-
ized technician, is not always the case with the other 
three categories: the physician, registered nurses and 
practical nurse. These other individuals who draw said 
sample, generally leave the analysis to a laboratory 
testing facility that meets the requirements and criteria 
both professionally and physically as is mandated by 
both federal and state regulations. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E COURT F A I L E D TO D E T E R -
M I N E W H E T H E R A D U L Y AU-
T H O R I Z E D L A B O R A T O R Y T E C H N I -
CIAN W O U L D B E A Q U A L I F I E D 
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E M P L O Y E E , A C T I N G W I T H I N T H E 
SCOPE O F H I S E M P L O Y M E N T , 
W I T H I N OR U N D E R T H E D I R E C -
TION O F A D U L Y C E R T I F I E D LAB-
ORATORY U N D E R T H E U T A H D I V I -
SION O F H E A L T H . 
The state by regulations of December 30, 1969, 
Attachment A, sets forth definitions in Section 1, au-
thorization and administration in section 2, minimum 
Standards and methods to be employed in section 3, 
and legal basis for laboratory approval in section 4 
thereof. 
In synopsis, the regulation provides that the direc-
tor can grant approval to a laboratory for one calendar 
year subject to annual renewal provided that the labor-
atory continues to perform satisfactorily and continues 
to meet the minimum standards as established by the 
regulations both as to physical facilities and technical 
performance. I t sets forth who may conduct tests and 
what personnel qualifications by way of education exist, 
and sets forth the minimum laboratory equipment, sup-
plies, and further the type of tests that will be recog-
nized for minimal technical standards. 
Persons acting within the scope of their employ-
ment within a properly approved laboratory facility 
either in or out of a hospital approved by the State Divi-
sion of Health would be acting within the terms of the 
statute, the State Health Department regulations in 
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line with the criteria set down by the Federal Highway 
Safety Act, Regulation, January 17, 1969, subpara-
graph 3(a) (1) et al. 
P O I N T V 
T H E COURT F U R T H E R E R R E D 
I N T H A T I F AS T H E O P I N I O N I N 
C H I E F SUGGESTS, T H E R E W A S A 
Q U E S T I O N A B O U T T H E A U T H O R -
I T Y O F MR. D A V I S , T H E N T H E 
CASE S H O U L D BE R E M A N D E D TO 
T H E T R I A L COURT TO M A K E A 
F A C T U A L D E T E R M I N A T I O N AS TO 
W H E T H E R MR. D A V I S W A S ACT-
I N G W I T H I N T H E SCOPE O F H I S 
E M P L O Y M E N T W H E N H E W A S 
. P R E S E N T A T T H E J A I L , P R E -
P A R E D TO T A K E A BLOOD SAM-
P L E , A T T H E D I R E C T I O N O F T H E 
P E A C E O F F I C E R , P U R S U A N T TO 
T H E S T A T U T E , SECTION 41-6-44,10, 
U T A H CODE A N N O T A T E D 1953, AS 
A M E N D E D . 
Appellant asserts there may be a need to remand 
the case back to the trial court for additional factual 
determination relative to the issue of whether Lynn 
Davis was acting within the scope of his authority or 
within the scope of his employment, which fact was not 
adduced. I t is conceded that were he not so acting within 
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the scope of his employment at the time and place in 
question, the ultimate result of this case would not 
change. 
I t is incumbent upon the court to so render a deci-
sion, with clarity and guidelines, on an issue so important 
to the health and welfare of the people of this state, to 
the public who deserve safe highways, who deserve the 
safety of driving and surviving, that the full responsi-
bilities, rights and obligations of Section 41-6-44.10 be 
complied with. Accordingly, the appellant is hereby 
urging in this brief in support of its petition for rehear-
ing that the court meet the issue head on as to whether 
or not there is such a thing as a "duly authorized labor-
atory' ' under the Utah State Department of Public 
Health as against duly unauthorized laboratories and 
technicians within the state as set forth by statutes and 
regulations. 
Whether or not the laboratory technician is a duly 
authorized laboratory technician is in truth a question 
of fact left as such by the legislature. Further, that 
information, if contested at the time of a hearing or 
court test, is one that can be adduced by testimony. 
Whether said laboratory technician is a "duly author-
ized" one, or whether the person performing or admin-
istering such a test in accordance with Section 41-6-44.10, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, is in fact 
a practical nurse, registered nurse, or physician, the 
other three categories, is likewise a question of fact. If 
their qualifications or their procedures in so administer-
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ing the test do not comply with the Utah Medical Prac-
tices Act as to any of the four in this general category, 
then the same may be challenged, and criminal liability 
could then lie should their failure to meet said standards 
occur. (Emphasis ours.) 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that the court 
afford an opportunity for counsel for appellant and 
respondent to further argue the issue, as to what if any 
credence the court must grant to Sections 26-15-4(10) 
and 26-15-4(20) granting certain rights and responsi-
bilities to the State Department of Health; and further 
to the Rules and Regulations as promulgated by the 
State of Utah, Department of Social Services, State 
Division of Health, dated December 30, 1969; and 
additionally, or in the alternative, to remand the matter 
back to the trial level to ascertain additional facts if 
deemed necessary by the court, relative to whether or 
not Mr. Davis at the time and place in question was 
acting in the scope of his employment as a technician 
for the Salt Lake City-County Health Department. 
Further, whether said laboratory, in the Salt Lake City-
County Health Department, was within the purview of 
the regulations of December 30, 1969, promulgated by 
the Utah State Board of Health, a "qualified" or "certi-
fied" laboratory, which appellant asserts was the case. 
In the case at bar, the Court, in the majority opin-
ion, did not have an issue whether (1) a test was admin-
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istered, (2) the validity of that test was being chal-
lenged, (3) the authority of the technician was chal-
lengend, or (4) the constitutionality of the statute was 
challenged as to what "duly authorized laboratory tech-
nician" meant. 
The Court did have a situation where the trial 
court made a ruling that was not based on the evidence 
but was wholly collateral, and speculative, since no test 
was given, and Mr. Gibb made no objection to Mr. 
Davis or his authority at the time of the incident. Mr. 
Gibb's only objection was to Mr. Davis' memory and 
that notes were taken by him of the incident, and com-
ment, damaging to Mr. Gibb, which Mr. Gibb made, 
and Mr. Davis recorded, and to which he testified. 
Mr. Davis' testimony of the refusal of Mr. Gibb, 
and his comments, were properly receivable and as 
valid as if given by another officer and not a laboratory 
technician. 
The court did not review the case on appeal on the 
facts or the merits, therefore erred, and the matter 
should be remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. R O M N E Y 
Attorney General 
B E R N A R D M. T A N N E R 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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